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ABSTRACT: 
While municipal bankruptcy as a whole is rare in the United States, since the Great Recession, 
fiscal distress in municipalities is common.  This is due to the compounding of decreased state 
aid, declining property values and increased need of services. In these fiscally and 
administratively challenging times, where the U.S. government is ripe and saddled with political 
discord, high debt/legacy costs, and decreased economic stability, can cities walk the stringent 
financial tightrope without falling head first? This research paper addresses the causations 
leading to municipal fiscal stress, role of the state as it relates to municipal financial health and 
best practices leading towards stabilization and recovery.  
 
Keywords: municipal fiscal stress, role of state, local government management, municipal 
bankruptcy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2013, the once glamorous and industrious Motown city, Detroit, filed for the largest 
municipal bankruptcy in the history of the United States (Foroohar, 2013). Detroit’s bankruptcy 
did not come as a surprise, in part due to the scandal and corruption charges plaguing the former 
Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.  The mayor’s unethical and corruptive practices on the 
taxpayer’s dime further intensified the city’s unstable finances resulting in bankruptcy shortly 
thereafter (Schaefer, 2013).  
While as a whole, municipal bankruptcies in America are rare, many cities are entering 
similar financial predicaments, albeit with differing scale and variability.  Detroit’s perfect storm 
of high unemployment rates, population decline, high debt obligations, , inept/corrupt leadership, 
high legal cost, bad investments, lack of funding streams and the flight of industries  
compounded its misfortune and gradual descent (Schaefer, 2013).   
Sadly, for Detroit, their predicament was preventable.  The state of Michigan has a strong 
state government, and by law can intervene in local governance during times of financial distress 
by assigning an emergency manager to redirect the city back into stable financial territory (Pew 
Charitable Trust, 2013).  Due to political jostling between state and local government, it was not 
until March 2013 (three months before Detroit filed for bankruptcy) that the city allowed the 
emergency manager to govern (The Detroit News, 2014).  This begs the question—if the state of 
Michigan, considered a strong state government, can by law intervene in local governance during 
a time of fiscal crisis, how did they allow the largest municipal bankruptcy in the history of the 
United States to occur?   
This research paper will address the following:  
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a. the trajectory of local financial distress leading up to bankruptcy;  
b. whether  strong state governments are conducive to stronger local finances; and  
c. stakeholder viewpoints on municipal financial management, fiscal stress and the role of 
the state. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Municipal fiscal stress is complicated.  Local governments in the United States have 
varying externalities that affects its financial health—not limited to environment, culture and 
economic considerations.  The following literature review will address the common attributes 
that lead up to municipal fiscal stress found in academic journals, public policy papers, and 
technical guidance from state and federal publications.  
A. Overview of Municipal Externalities 
The key to long-term municipal planning is having a strong financial foundation, which 
includes many environmental factors that may or may not be controllable, and their effects on the 
financial position of the municipality.  As identified by the 2008 Guide to Financial Condition 
Analysis, the Office of the New York State Comptroller’s office, the following externalities to 
consider are: 
i. Environmental—Environmental circumstances consistently help detect future financial 
strain (page 2).  These metrics include population trends, median household income 
levels, unemployment rates, property value trends, educational attainment, age and 
characteristics, poverty indicators, such as numbers of single heads of households as a 
percentage of your community’s population (page 2). 
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ii. Organizational– Management and legislative programming creates the financial 
infrastructures and conditioning in which the municipality operates (page 3).  Naturally, 
poor management and unfavorable legislative practices destroys fiscal prudence (page 3).  
Once an unfavorable financial infrastructure is instituted, no matter how sound the 
budgeting and management practices are thereafter, crisis may not be forestalled (page 3).  
Manifestations of this fiscal stress will transpire in repetition in expenditures (i.e., 
salaries, fringe, contractual), recurring major expenditures by object (i.e., salaries, 
fringes, contractual), debt outstanding and debt service levels, and percentage of tax and 
debt limit (page 3). 
iii. Financial conditioning– Financial constraints comprising of intergovernmental duress 
such as tax and debt limits, mandated expenditures, unfavorable schedules for financial 
transactions confines the pathways for municipalities to control their fiscal outcomes 
(page 2). 
B. Devolution Revolution  
Illiquidity is the key causation of bankruptcy in small cities.  For most illiquid towns, the 
story began with devolution.   Devolution, as described by Bowman and Kearney (2011) in 
“Second-Order Devolution: Data and Doubt” is the process of localities gaining more autonomy 
and authority from state governance.  In sum, decentralization.  Devolution gained popularity in 
the 1990s and is often referred to as the “the devolution revolution” (Cole, 1999). 
Bowman and Kearney (2011) illustrated that this trend has some real advantages. Of the major 
advantages, it includes service delivery efficiencies, cost savings for purchased services, creative 
policy making, citizen participation, greater accountability and transparency, and reducing the 
legislative workload by assuming more control in local policy. Overtime, devolution brought in 
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new players in local service delivery including non-profits and public private partnerships (Cole, 
1999).  
Devolution’s goal was to push forward creative local policies and control that bypasses 
state interception (Cole, 1999). While devolution worked efficiently in many towns, if 
devolution occurs in a struggling community, not yet up to the task of implementing these 
increased responsibilities, failure will follow (Bowman, 2011). More, not all, localities are good 
candidates for devolution. By far, this is the largest drawback of devolution: giving too much 
power and authority to a locality not equipped to handle it.   
C. Type of Municipal Income and Debt 
As more states devolve, state aid to municipalities decreases.  As a result, cities rely on 
other funding streams to facilitate their operations, including sales tax (i.e., non-property tax), 
income tax, user charges and fees (i.e., special police detail, parking fees, parks and recreation 
usage), property tax, and creative financing (i.e., zero coupon bonds, compound interest bonds) 
(Campbell, 1983) . The largest percentage of incomes in towns is property tax.  In most cities 
and towns, raising taxes on its citizens is never a popular platform to resolve fiscal distress.  As 
such, many municipalities incur debt to finance municipal projects (Morrison, 2002).   
When a municipality wants to finance a project such as a new school or a bridge, it will go 
into debt by issuing bonds (Morrison, 2002).  In exchange for loan, the city will pay interest 
accrued for the life of the loan (Morrison, 2002). To ensure the fidelity of the borrower, 
municipal credibility is monitored extensively by credit rating agencies (Morrison, 2002).  A 
strong credit rating is in the best interest of the municipality, as it will ensure future loans for 
capital improvements (Morrison, 2002). The following are types of municipal debts:  
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i. General obligation debt:  General obligation bonds are long-term loans secured “full 
faith and credit,” to finance large capital expenditures such as building of a new school 
(Morrison, 2002).  As it is a “full faith and credit” loan, it is considered a safe investing 
vehicle and its lower interest rate reflects this (Morrison, 2002).  If any improprieties 
occurred during the issuing of this debt without proper procedures or channels—it can be 
voided (Morrison, 2002).   
ii. Special obligation debt: A special obligation loan which does not pledge “full faith and 
credit” and is used for borrowing on special projects such as a sports stadium to support 
economic development (Morrison, 2002).  This debt is paid through a designated funding 
stream and only that funding stream (Morrison, 2002).  It is also subjected to federal 
income tax (Morrison, 2002).  Special obligation debt demands a higher interest rate as it 
is not secured (Morrison, 2002).  
iii. Current accounts deficits:  Perhaps the most controversial type of debt, current accounts 
deficits are deficits that occur in current year operations unbalanced due to unanticipated 
circumstances (i.e., fire, terrorism, natural disasters, personnel strikes) and are generally 
paid by short-term municipal borrowing from other municipal accounts.  This is also 
referred to as “cash flow borrowing” (Morrison, 2002).  Cash flow borrowing is one of 
the main reasons pensions are not fully funded.  Often times, current pensions consumed 
by retirees are in part paid by current year deductions (Morrison, 2002).  Unfunded 
current accounts deficits may be problematic if there are more retirees collecting pensions 
than the workers who fund the pension (Morrison, 2002).    
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D. The Unquiet Tempering: Unfunded Pensions 
One of the most affrighting municipal debts is underfunding pensions.  Affrighting because 
it does not immediately show up on municipal balance sheets (Mattoon, 2011).  Furthermore, 
low pension funding is positively correlated to the financial stress (Kemp, 1988).  
In general, there are two forms of municipal pension plans:   
i. Defined contribution—A defined contribution retirement benefit is based on the 
employee’s contribution levels plus the performance of the stock market.  As it is tied to 
market performance, there is a level of uncertainty on the amount the pensioner receivers 
during retirement (Kemp, 1988). 
ii. Define benefits—A defined benefit plan is a retirement plan where a municipality assures 
a explicate benefit based on a pre-negotiated formula based on pensioner earnings, years 
of service and age (Kemp, 1988).  A defined benefit plan is fixed and not based on 
market performance (Kemp, 1988). 
At times, a municipality may determine that it is in their financial interest to defer the 
funding of a pension plan, as there are no implications or disincentives (Kemp, 1988).  Cities 
acting on this will assume a current deficits debt (Morrison, 2002).  When a municipality 
declines to fund its pensions, it essentially is accepting a loan from its employees (Kemp, 1988).  
By accepting this loan, municipalities are delaying their commitment and burden of payment to 
future taxpayers at an increase contribution level (Kemp, 1988).  This debt is real and therefore is 
capable of jeopardizing the prosperity of the municipality should they default on this debt 
(Kemp, 1988).  Unfortunately, many cities fall into the trap of underfunding their pensions, 
especially since there is an absence of ordinances and regulations that oversee this phenomenon 
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unlike private sector pensions (Kemp, 1988).  To offset this potential crisis, municipal leadership 
must control debts to avoid future uncertainty (Kemps, 1988). 
E. Municipal Financial Strain 
Municipal financial strain occurs when the current operating revenues (i.e., taxes, fees, 
revenue sharing, other income) are less than the current operating expenses (i.e.,  general 
obligations debt, special obligations debt, current accounts deficits) (Kemp, 1988).   When the 
operating revenue falls below the operating expenses, a financial strain occurs (Kemp, 1988).  
Municipalities can quickly cloak this deficit by borrowing against their debt (Kemp, 1988).  In 
personal finance, there is a perception of good debt (i.e., student loan, mortgage) and bad debt 
(i.e., credit card).  This is also true for municipal finance.  Good debt is considered investments 
made to infrastructure, such as road or schools (Kemp, 1988).  Bad debt is referenced as keeping 
the current operating deficits afloat (Kemp, 1988).  Bad debt will eventually result in a tax hike 
or decreased municipal service (Kemp, 1988).  When a municipality goes down the route of bad 
debt, it generally puts municipalities in a weaker economic position that jeopardizes its standing 
in the eyes of its citizens and lenders (Kemp, 1988).   
F. Fiscal Relief in Challenging Times 
Under state law, cities must balance their budget (Hansen, 1991).  Highly resourceful 
financial officers will start the course of the year by budgeting conservatively by over-estimating 
spending and under-estimating revenue expectations (Hansen, 1991). Hence always producing a 
surplus.  Moreover, it is considered wise for financial officers to cushion a 5% yearend balance 
in their general budget for unexpected expenditures (i.e., budget error, natural disaster) (Hansen, 
1991).  Ideally, this 5% yearend surplus will not be spent, and instead saved into a rainy day fund 
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(Hansen, 1991).  Moreover, to maximize additional cost savings it is important that 
municipalities continually monitor, analyze and identify expenditures.   
In times of budget scarcity, cities can achieve substantial savings by trimming travel or 
implementing hiring freezes (Hanson, 199).  Beyond this, additional targeted reductions may 
include across the board reductions, furloughs, postponement in pension fund contributions, tax 
increases, spending investment deferrals, layoffs, and borrowing bonds (Hansen, 1991).  Finance 
officers need to tread a fine line when it comes to presenting unpopular decisions, such as tax 
increases, as tax increases will not solve a financial crisis.  In fact, tax rates can peak at their 
“revenue hill” and from there revenues may fall, which will only create further economic 
affliction and inefficiencies (Inman, 1995). 
During a cyclical economic downturn, governments face revenue scarcity, unemployment 
escalation, increased demands for public assistance, and housing instability (Hansen, 1991).  In 
the 1990’s, Philadelphia encountered such a fiscal crisis. In September 1990, Philadelphia 
attempted to borrow $375 million from the municipal bond market, $187 million more than the 
previous year (Inman, 1995).  The municipal bond market reacted with alarm and concern and 
rejected their request (Inman, 1995).  This sent the city into a three-year fiscal crisis (Inman, 
1995).  In a bind, Philadelphia had to analyze their expenditures and restructure their obligations.  
This crisis resulted in an increase in their sales tax by 1 percent, two-year wage freezes for 
municipal employees, and a reduction of employee benefits. Residents had to cope with reduced 
public services (Inman, 1995).  Moving forward, Philadelphia became more proactive in seeking 
aid from state and federal resources to combat illiquidity instead of using their general funds 
(Inman, 1995).  Philadelphia also became very uncompromising with their labor contract 
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negotiations (Inman, 1995).  In sum, to achieve fiscal relief actualization, a change in the service 
delivery structure must involve the cooperation of corporations, states, and local interest groups 
(Campbell, 1983). 
G. Bankruptcy Predicament 
State statutes dictate terms for cities should they become insolvent, and they must adhere to 
these edicts (Morrison, 2002).  Generally, municipalities are unique and have differing 
definitions of insolvency (Morrison, 2002).  Cities are free to choose their path, as long as they 
follow the law, however irresponsible (Morrison, 2002).  States do have significant interest in 
local financial health.  If a town defaults on their loan, by the way of contagion, other 
municipalities and states by association will be affected by their actions (Campbell, 1983).  
Specifically, if a municipality defaults on their loan, the state’s credit worthiness and their ability 
to borrow is also compromised (Campbell, 1983).  Generally, states impose debt limits for cities 
and parallel governmental entities (i.e., economic developments, schools) (Morrison, 2002).  
States also establishes rules to impeded towns from exorbitant borrowing (Morrison, 2002).  
Some towns must seek a public referendum to debate and request an increase to public 
borrowing (Morrison, 2002).    
A fiscal predicament occurs when the city fails to augment revenues or raise adequate 
funds to meet its legal debt obligations (Inman, 1995).  In simple terms, avoiding bankruptcy is 
easy: earn more than you spend.  However, cities are more intricate and weave a wider net.   
Four externalities unmanageable by the city that exasperate municipal finances include: (1) 
economic troughs that decrease tax revenues; (2) the flight of high income generators which 
results in a decrease in high-income generating tax base; (3) increase in disadvantageous 
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demography that necessitate additional resources; (4) reduction of state and federal aids to 
municipalities (Inman, 1995).  While devolution and decentralization of municipalities may yield 
more local control it results in less jurisdiction on expenditure controls from the state (Inman, 
1995).    
H. Causations Leading up to Fiscal Stress 
There are many causes that lead up to municipal distress.  The following are recent case studies 
that pushed municipalities to the brink of bankruptcy:  
i. Underfunding/overpromising obligations 
Vallejo, CA– Vallejo promised labor unions significant obligations that could not be 
fulfilled (Mattoon, 2009).  By fiscal year 08/09, labor commitments alone were $79.4 
million (Matton, 2009).  Unfortunately, in fiscal year 08/09 the town only had 
revenue totaling $77.9 million—for the whole town operation (Mattoon, 2009)! 
ii. Lawsuits 
Westfall, PA– Westfall was sued by a real estate developer after reneging on a 
promise to allow for a hotel development (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). After much 
legal contention, the federal judge motioned the town to pay a $20 million dollar 
settlement (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). Sadly, the town only generated roughly $1 
million in revenue per year (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). 
iii. Overextended/incorrect capital investments 
Harrisburg, PA- In 2003, Harrisburg committed to build a town incinerator (Matton, 
2009).  Due to delays in construction, poor management, restructuring of debt, the 
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cost overruns skyrocketed to $282 million dollars, a staggering amount for a town 
populated by 47,000 residents (Matton, 2009). 
iv. Poor business management/accounting practices 
New York City, NY— Inadequate financial practices, compounded with inept 
leadership led to New York City’s inability to meet its short-term contractual 
obligations in 1975 (Morrison, 2002). 
v. Poor investments 
Orange County, CA- Orange County, one of the wealthiest towns in America, invested 
and borrowed against high-risk funds including derivatives, inverse floaters, reverse 
purchase agreements and long-term high yield bonds, which eroded in value 
precipitously (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). 
I. State’s Role in Municipal Oversight  
In 2012, in an attempt to address the concerns of municipal bankruptcies The National 
Association for State Budget Officers produced an issue brief titled “Municipal Bankruptcy & 
the Role of the States,” which outlined the following:  
i. “State laws are shaped by local crisis”— States do not hold uniform views concerning 
its recognition and the legality of municipal bankruptcies (page 3).  In fact, many states 
do not recognize bankruptcies or implement reactive statutes to manage municipal fiscal 
emergencies (page 3). As such, states may want to consider strategic legislation on 
policies regarding local financial duress instead of implementing reactive legislation that 
may result in unforeseen ramifications (page 3). 
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ii. “Localities often resist state intervention”—During financial duress, states may 
intervene and oversee local operations to control further financial ailment (page 4).  Since 
control of municipal finance affects retirees, employees and other stakeholders—a natural 
tension may occur as states are viewed acrimoniously as cost cutting strategist (page 4).  
This dynamic depends on the history of the relationship between the state and the 
municipality (page 4).  Transparency by the state during this transition is the key to 
municipal cooperation (page 4).  
iii. “The underlying cause of the crisis matters”—When states enter into a difficult 
municipal predicament, they must act with prudence as it sets precedence in their state 
(page 5).  States tend to assist municipalities that suffer financial distress due to external 
forces (i.e., economic stress, natural disaster) and exhibit common core governmental 
operations (page 5).  Generally, states intervene during this time as a precaution to ward 
off adverse reverberations that affect credit and borrowing charges for the surrounding 
areas (page 5).  States, however, resist intervening on internal causations of fiscal stress 
(i.e., inept management, corruption) that chiefly point to one particular event (page 5). 
iv. “State role can have credit rating implications”—Due to the economic downturns, states 
have a stake in creating a legal roadmap that helps municipalities navigate through a 
period of financial distress (page 5).  Declining property tax and revenues may force 
municipalities to rely on borrowing to maintain some forms of liquidity (page 5).  If 
“looming defaults” are in the horizon, investors are deterred from loaning the necessary 
funds, which will have credit implications and consequences on the municipality and 
state (page 5).  
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J. State’s Role in Managing Municipal Finances 
When municipalities are struggling financially, states have historically intervened 
(Anderson, 2012).  As mentioned, no two cities are alike as it is relative to the economic and 
financial conditioning.  In a 2013 study commissioned by Pew Charitable Trust, nineteen states 
can intervene on behalf of a city, town or county during a financial crisis (Matton, 2014).  The 
degree of state interference varies (Matton, 2014).  Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island have a more aggressive approach to intervention (Matton, 2014).  Here are the 
varying degrees of state intervention:  
i. Consultancy: North Carolina founded the Local Government Commission in 1931 during 
the Great Depression to address the upsurge in municipal financial delinquencies 
(Matton, 2014).  Notably, when a town’s reserves are under 8%, the state of North 
Carolina will provide consultancy to afflicted communities or provide receivership 
assistance (Matton, 2014).  North Carolina has one of the most proactive approaches to 
governing municipalities in financial crisis (Matton, 2014) 
ii. Oversight: Another scenario occurred in the 1970’s in New York City.  At the time, NYC 
was suffering a host of ailments including increased need population, inflation, high 
unemployment, housing rent controls, powerful and inflexible labor unions, and 
questionable accounting practices (Rabinowitz, 1976).  More pressing, NYC was not able 
to pay its vendors on time.  As a result, the New York state legislators created a state 
agency called the Municipal Acceptance Corporation (MAC) (Morrison, 2002).  
Essentially, MAC transgressed from the American municipal finance rules to save NYC.  
MAC pushed forth long-term bonds to pay for short-term debt in exchange for the right 
Yong-Hua He 
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities  
University of Massachusetts Boston 
19 | P a g e  
 
to claim NYC’s future revenues (Morrison, 2001).  Moving forward, MAC has the 
authority to offer final budget approval, agreement on contractors and other related 
expenses (Morrison, 2002).  Additionally, the New York state legislatures passed the 
Financial Emergency Act, which created a seven-member board to oversee the control of 
the NYC’s budget with the goal of achieving a yearly balanced budget (Rabinowitz, 
1976).  Upon accepting these terms, NYC had to reduced staff by 20.8%, including 
higher education (-28.6%), health and hospital (-22.4%), education (-20.2%), fire (-
17.1%), police (-16.8%), environmental protection (-15.8%) and social services (-13.7%) 
(Glassberg, 1978).    
iii. Receivership: Since the filing of bankruptcy in Central Falls, Rhode Island and Detroit, 
Michigan, both states have amended their laws to allow possible receivership and state 
takeovers of local governments (Anderson, 2012).  The power of the laws vary.  The 
most drastic state intervention includes replacing all elected officials with appointees 
(Anderson, 2012); abandoning all city’s local ordinances and until stability is restored 
(Anderson, 2012); and democratic dissolution (Anderson, 2012).  This is sometimes 
referred to as “financial martial law” even though the politically correct term is 
“democratic dissolution” (Anderson, 2012).    
State receivership creates the most uncertainty for a city.  It creates a legal limbo for the 
town (Anderson, 2012).  Generally, there are three main components to state receivership and 
their main oversight to address fiscal instability: (1) judicial receivership to exert control to 
increase taxes for immediate payment to counter credit defaults; (2) if applicable, the ability to 
exercise the right to Chapter 9 bankruptcy reorganization; (3) if applicable, receivership can 
allow an overseer to sort out affairs (Anderson, 2012).   
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The most powerful administrator for a city under receivership is the “emergency manager” 
(Anderson, 2012).  While municipal power and authority is facilitated by the state, the day-to-
day operations including municipal services, taxes or land size to whom it serves continues to be 
operated by the city (Anderson, 2012).  In this capacity, the emergency manager has the power to 
coordinate meetings, set agendas, dispose policies, and oversee activities (Anderson, 2012).  
Moreover, an emergency manager may have the capacity to fire elected officials (Anderson, 
2012).  The most controversial executive control of an emergency manager is their ability to 
renege, renegotiate, and delay collective bargaining agreements which are currently active 
(Anderson, 2012).    
If a town is financially reckless, they may have to abandon their democracy for state 
centralization of power for the long haul (Anderson, 2012). Critics noted that emergency policies 
are reactive, as some emergency mangers may want to privatize city operations, auction off 
priceless public goods, and abort crucial projects or programming (Anderson, 2012).  Critics 
noted these quick fires are reactionary decisions that put the town’s uniqueness and cultural 
identity in jeopardy (Anderson, 2012).  Tensions may arise between the state and the 
municipality.  This muddies the clarity of mission and further corrupts effective governance 
(Anderson, 2012). 
K. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy 
Municipalities are not subject to forthright state supervision (Morrison, 2012).  State legislatures 
generally allow municipalities to function as an independent entity as long as they follow the 
edict prescribed by law (Morrison, 2002).  If a city disobeys the law, state legislators may create 
statutory solutions so they are not countering the law (Morrison, 2002).  On rare occasions, if a 
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municipality is acting against their legal obligations, a state can create an entity to become an 
overseer of the city (Morrison, 2002).  
When a city believes they essentially are insolvent, there are several courses of action: 
leveraging debt, receiving a bailout from state, or filing for bankruptcy.  Under state law, only 
the municipality can file for bankruptcy, as creditors cannot force debtors into it (Morrison, 
2002). Chapter 9 protection under the Federal Bankruptcy Code deals with the insolvency 
pertaining to local government.  Despite federal courts trumping municipal ordinances, states can 
step in as an intermediary (Morrison, 2002).  A state cannot impose creditors to receive less than 
their declaration (Morrison, 2002).  However, a federal court can declare a decision on all 
creditors (Morrison, 2002).  Unlike commercial bankruptcy, creditors must accept this federal 
decision and cannot appeal (Morrison, 2002).  Upon the final exchange in agreement, the 
municipality is cleared from its debt.  
Municipal bankruptcies are complex as they are subject to the legalities of federal, state, 
and local laws, which occasionally dissent (Foroohar, 2013).  The end goal is to restructure debt 
obligations in a manageable systematic manner conducive to the benefit of all parties involved.  
Naturally, it is in the interest of the bankrupt cities to repay their debt—otherwise, borrowers and 
other stakeholders will refuse to support or funds cities in desperate need of capital or services in 
the future. Herein lies the problem: bankrupt cities are in no condition to repay all creditors; 
therefore, all creditors will fight separately to legally ensure their share of obligations are 
safeguarded (McConnell, 1993).  For general obligation bonds and current accounts deficit, a tax 
increase is generally instituted to pay for these debts (Morrison, 2002).  Special obligations on 
the other hand, are treated “pro rata” which is divided among the creditors (Morrison, 2002).  
Yong-Hua He 
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities  
University of Massachusetts Boston 
22 | P a g e  
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
The goal of this exploratory research is:  (a) to confirm if strong state government leads to 
stronger local finances; and (b) to delve into the relationship dynamics between a strong state 
government and its municipalities as it relates to fiscal distress. 
To respond to the first research inquiry, this paper will examine the data gathered from the 
United States Census Bureau, including the 2011 annual survey of state and local government 
finances, 2011 state government employment and payroll data, and the 2011 American 
community survey. The United States Census Bureau data offers reliable, comprehensive and 
consistent data, which is good for benchmarking.  The notable downside of using the annual 
survey of state and local government finances, when compared to the comprehensive annual 
financial reports (CAFR), is it does not contain financial disclosures such as upcoming schedule 
of debt payments or pension obligations, which offers additional insights on the long-term 
financial health of the municipality (Rivernbark, 2009).  Additionally, for this research, the 
designation of strong, limited, special, and no state government intervention is heavily 
influenced by the Pew Charitable Trusts’ (2013) paper, “State Role in Local Government 
Financial Distress.” A strong state government is not exclusive to allowing bankruptcy 
authorization, laws addressing fiscal distress, and instilling interventionary programs.  Instead, a 
strong state government is holistic in its approach when addressing municipal fiscal distress, 
which includes its willingness and ability to step in and negotiate the restructuring of 
environmental, financial and organizational areas of concern.  With this consideration, this 
research paper designated strength of state government as follows:      
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 Strong government—Over seven affirmatives confirming support of local 
government in times of fiscal distress 
 Limited state interference—Between three to seven affirmatives addressing  
support of local government during times of fiscal distress 
 Special state interference—Between one to three affirmatives addressing support 
of local government, generally school districts or townships, in times of fiscal 
distress  
 No state interference—Little to no interference addressing support of local 
government during times of fiscal distress 
Please visit Table 1 chart in the Appendix section to view the state characteristics and categories.  
Lastly, a weighted ratio was created and heavily influenced by the various metrics determining 
financial health as noted by Ken Brown’s 10 point test of financial condition and the 
International City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) financial trend monitoring 
system. This research, like many government entities, creates hybrid metrologies to measure 
their fiscal health, as there is no dominant adoption of commanding indexes system (Crosby, 
2013).  Generally, the indicator system adopted by the government entity is incorporated 
specifically to the uniqueness of “population, land area, service levels, citizen demands, and 
overall net worth” (Crosby, 2013).  To ensure the usage of consistent metrics, this paper will 
focus on the following stressors of financial dimension as disclosed by Rivenbark (2009): 
 Financial Performance—signals if the municipality’s fiscal footing is 
positive or negative as a result of asset circulation (page 6) 
 Self Sufficiency—signals if the service transactions covers expenditures (page 
6) 
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 Liquidity—  signals if municipality can address short term debts (page 8) 
 Solvency— signals if municipality can address long term debts (page 8) 
 Leverage— informs if the amount of total assets funded by long term debt 
(page 8) 
Please see Table 2 in the Appendix for the detailed breakdown of the quantitative metrics and 
ratios.  
To respond to the second research inquiry, this research paper will focus on the strong 
state government of Massachusetts and the actors within the Commonwealth as it relates to 
municipal fiscal health.  Through snowballing stakeholder interviews, this paper includes 
opinions from resident, financial analyst, state aid coordinator, city manager, municipal leaders 
and other public private partners dedicated to supporting strong municipal governance.  All 
interview questions are constructed based on the stakeholder’s field, area of expertise and 
position.  Some recordings were permitted and transcribed by researcher.  Sample interview 
questions are located in the Other section of the Appendix.  Moreover, the researcher attended 
the “Technological Innovation in Government Symposium: toward open and smart government” 
at University of Massachusetts Boston on April 5, 2014 to supplement this research.  
Additionally, one area the researcher focused is school district, as it an integral part of the 
municipal operation, and as they make up about 36% of local expenditures (Census, 2011).  
Furthermore, school districts operate with relative autonomy, separate from City Hall and often 
overseen by the a school committee or elected officials.  Adding to the intricacy, school districts 
are heavily monitored by accountability laws.   
The following are lists the stakeholder associations and characteristics interviewed in this 
research:  
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A. School department supporting 56,000 students and a FY14 budget of $934 
million. 
B. State agency with FY2014 budget of $5.7 billion and distributes more than $4.3 
billion in state aid to cities in towns. 
C. Local government with 636,000 residents covering 48 square miles with a FY14 
budget of $2.6 billion. 
D. Local government with 35,080 residents covering 1.8 square miles with a FY14 
budget of $131 million. 
E. Higher education institution that has an extension that supports and offers 
municipal consultancy in performance management, organizational studies, 
research, charter reform and regionalization.  
F. Not otherwise specified category is specific to the anecdotal testimonies noted in 
the Technological Innovation in Government Symposium. 
The researcher inserted italicized direct quotes from stakeholders in the summary of findings and 
recommendation sections. 
IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The recent economic decline has wrecked the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ budget 
and its ability to distribute expansive state aid to municipalities as it had in the past.  
Unfortunately, this economic trend is not reversing.  As a result, Massachusetts has become more 
devolved, encouraging local government to become more independent from state funding and 
have promoted municipalities to raise their revenues locally.  This is trend is aligned with 
Massachusetts’ adherence to the philosophy of “local control, local decisions.”  As a progressive 
state, the only exceptions made to localities with regards to state aid funding are those with 
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significant shifts in demography such as higher population or poverty rates.  Furthermore, state 
aid funding aligns to a state aid driven formula relative to its local expenditures, property taxes, 
and general wealth.  Wealthier towns are assigned the status of “minimum aid,” while 
impoverished towns in the Commonwealth receive larger portions of their revenue from state 
aid.   
In this research, through stakeholder interview the following are summaries of findings:  
1. A stronger government does not lead to stronger municipal finances 
Based on the data analysis used in this research paper, there is no evidence that suggests a 
strong state government leads to stronger local government finance.  In fact, six of the ten local 
governments with a high weighted ratio signifying strong liquidity, positive demographics, and 
financial standing have no state interference to local governance.  Only two strong governments 
are in the top ten with Massachusetts ranking at #3 and Rhode Island ranking at #10.  Both states 
have suffered shaky muncipal grounding in the past (Chelsea in 1991 and Central Falls in 2011 
respectively).  The bottom ten state governements have five states that have the designation of 
strong state governments.  Please visit the Appendix for the methodology and designisation 
distinguishments. 
2. Fiscally distressed entities have faint adherence to core municipal operations 
Core municipal operations are simple: public safety, public works, and education.  In 
sum: keep the streets clean, the population safe, and educate the next generation. As simple as 
the mission is, some municipal leadership in fiscally distressed towns often forget the core 
mission, especially when corruption is involved.  Naturally, loose fiscal oversight and 
management has significant consequences for the residents.    
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In 1991, a city in Massachusetts, due to corruption and bad fiscal management, became 
insolvent and unable to meet its obligations to its vendors and employees.  As a result, the city 
was left in squalid conditions: crime spiked, and their school system, chronically labeled as one 
of the lowest performing in the state, was handed control to a local university.  One of the only 
redeeming qualities during this crisis was the relative affordability of the city, which attracted a 
higher need population.   
One resident who attended public school student at the time commented, “Education 
wise, I was fine, as I was a quick learner.  However, I cannot say the same for the students who 
had special needs or language barriers.  Services provided [by the school district] were not 
sufficient [for this population].”  Not surprisingly, it is the neediest population in the city that 
suffers most from loose and poor local municipal governance.  
3. The culture sets the foundation for organizational decisions 
Leadership lays the cultural foundation for a organization.  Decisions, actions and 
policies set by the top, trickles downwards to the administrative players who implement the 
policies.  If a mission is not clear or can be loosely translated it creates chaos.  While strong 
leaders may help correct some organizational dysfunction, they cannot correct a broken system.  
Additionally, many departmental leaders are often hired due to their expertise but may have 
limited skills in budgetary or business management.  This is especially true for school districts.  
For many novice principals and school leaders, they are in desperate need for operational and 
technical budgetary assistance.  Unfortunately, due to limited resources, even budget 
professionals assigned to tasks are overwhelmed with their workload.  As such, many leaders 
default to politicking to obtain adequate resources, “for every rule you have 15 exceptions and if 
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push hard enough… you can be the exception.” Hardly a strong foundation to make sweeping 
changes or creation of strong fiscal policies.  
4. The externalities effect the conditioning of organizations 
To preface: the spending of municipal monies are often times complicated and not 
transparent. A common “fire” that occurs in the school district is, “how do I access my money?” 
typically asked during the end of the fiscal year.  The reason is that to spend municipal funds 
there are a lot of cumbersome contract and legalities to consider.  “You have to go through a lot 
of regulations and rules, which a lot of people are not taught well or taught only once and then 
are expected to remember for 20 years.”  In this world, municipal rules and regulations are “seen 
as a hindrance” which complicates the delivery of services.  As a result, some department heads 
and school leaders delay the spending on monies, as it is too complicated to consider, until last 
minute.  This often leads to waste or inefficiencies.  
5. If there is state or federal aid, competition may be fierce 
For schools districts in Massachusetts, they are foreshadowing an increase in the cap on 
charter schools.  This will result in more competition for monies and resources.  “The increase in 
charter schools takes a portion of state and federal funding from us.” Unfortunately, this is not 
the only grievance.  Some charter schools attract or poach some of the best public schools 
students, and reject lower performing students.  This leaves mostly special needs and English 
language learners in the public schools system, populations who  are considered more expensive 
to support or an added burden to the already struggling school districts. 
6. Accountability laws drive state monitoring 
High municipal salaries and benefits are a hot topic in Massachusetts.  It was reported 
that the Massachusetts’ state capital, Boston, 1 in 4 municipal employees earned over $100,000   
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whereas only 7% of its state employees earn over $100,000 (Ryan, 2014).  In a state that heavily 
subscribes to the philosophy of “local control, local decisions” they cannot and will not dictate 
this an area of concern.  As interviewee commented, “As long as they meet net school spending 
and follow the law we don’t dictate” how they spend their funding. The only exception for state 
intervention is when “accountability laws come into play to put pressure on the municipalities.”  
Specifically, when student performances are consistently poor and the student’s legal rights to 
gain a proper education is possibility compromised, then that state would consider a “more 
invasive approach.”  
Not surprising for many urban school districts, the highest expenditure and fastest rising 
cost for school districts are special education and English language learners, two populations 
where service delivery is monitored, as they are attached to accountability laws.  Due to the 
myriad legal ramifications, it is “difficult to reign in the inefficiencies” and “sometimes… we just 
need to send another bus… on the road… unnecessarily… as we have a commitment.”  
7. Budget drives programming 
As a city manager poignantly stated, “If you do not have budget balanced every year, and if you 
are not generating enough revenues than what you are planning to spend, then you can’t really 
do much else.”  This statement is often resonated by many in municipal and state employees.  
The highest rising cost and area of concern is Human Capital and benefits.  Many municipalities 
are facing declining revenues, and upcoming collective bargaining contract negotiations are 
foreseen to be contentious.  The worst-case scenario for municipalities? All of the bargaining 
contracts may “cumulatively” receive their raises all at once.  The results will be disastrous for 
their budget and future programming.    
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8. Local government must take initiative to seek financial relief 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is struggling financially; as such, local government must 
take initiative to seek financial relief.   “During the economic downturn, there was a decrease in 
state aid. There was not as generous annual increase in state aid.  Districts cannot rely on state 
aid as a annual source of revenue with increase.  If they wanted to increase their revenue, it had 
to be done locally.”  Additionally, “We certainty encourage regionalization at the state level,” 
but it is “difficult to convince a high performing district to take on the problem district” as “a lot 
incentive must happen.”   
While the Commonwealth has passed laws to help cities seeking financial relief, it was 
acknowledged, “There is not a lot of money.” Instead, some cities seek technical assistance from 
the Commonwealth’s Administration and Finance department, “To discuss resources. To 
streamline services.  To help regionalize services.  And in some cases to privatize service.” One 
city leader noted that some transactions with long-term cost savings have a very substantial 
upfront cost, “We can’t go to the voters and ask for $300 million to restructure [debt] this one 
time.  It doesn’t work that way…the state does not have that kind of resources.”  As such, the city 
must consider the entrepreneurial options for fiscal relief, “buying and selling land is one 
avenue.” 
9. Laws created to support municipalities in fiscal distress may not resolve 
underlying problem 
While rare, the commissioner of elementary and secondary education may use 
accountability laws to exert their authority over the school’s budget.  However, true change 
occurs “through the appointment of a receiver.” It is then at the state has more authority and 
more say on how the funds are spent and “in terms of personnel—hiring and firing.”  Among the 
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many concerns to receivership, one worry is that “it is so new.  It is hard to say whether state 
fiscal control has done anything to improve” the status and the future of the school districts. 
There was at least one expectation.  Due to fiscal distress, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts stepped in to help the regional school system of Athol-Royalston, located in a 
former industrial town in western Massachusetts.  While the school district was not assigned a 
receiver, it exhibited compromising characteristics: high percentage of special educational 
students, students consistently performing “poorly” on state standards exams and the population 
suffers from significant “poverty.”  Due to Athol-Royalston’s fiscal stress, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts enacted legislation to provide financial relief.  In Athol-Royaliston’s  response to 
the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education in the District Review 
Report (2013), they reported their “business office has worked with the Department of Revenue 
to manage the restrictions put on the district by Chapter 50 of the Acts of 2006, An Act 
regulating the financial conditions in the Athol-Royalston Regional School District, which 
allowed the district to borrow $1,000,000 from the state and which was necessitated by the 
financial condition of the district just before the present superintendent assumed his position.” 
Moreover, the district “yielded substantial savings (2013),” piggybacking on the state’s 
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission insurance rates.  Unfortunately, despite their new 
financial stability, “the students still do not perform any better.” 
10. Your elected officials and school committee are generally laymen and not 
technical experts 
There is tons of blame to go around when municipalities enter into a fiscally distressing 
predicament. This includes, but is not limited to: school committees, selectman, other elected 
officials, and the superintendent.  The underlying problem there is a “certain amount of due 
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diligence that they did not do.  You should not agree to everything the [director] tells you”—as a 
stakeholders should be objective.   Obviously, a certain amount of “technical assistance” is 
needed but not provided.  In sum, “finance committee, select boards are lay people and not 
technical experts.  The state can only do so much because the state has limited resources and 
people.”  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to the extended economic decline, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is continuing 
to struggle financially.  With state aid declining, local government must improve its efficiencies, 
generate cost savings and increase entrepreneurial spirits.  Naturally, this is easily said than done.  
The following are recommendations based on the stakeholder interviews: 
1. Municipalities must expand beyond their core services 
Core municipal operations seem simple: keep the streets clean, keep the population safe, 
and educate the next generation.  Exceptional municipalities must expand upon this mission.  
Truly exceptional towns reach for great schools, economic growth, job opportunities, dining and 
shopping options, health and medical access, and an active nightlife.  This formula attracts young 
professionals or high-income couples seeking respite and cash to spend.  While ‘gentrification’ 
has become an ugly word, it is necessary for municipalities who desire to take their cities to the 
next level.  A delicate balance of demography, including high and middle to low income 
families, is the key to long-term municipal stabilization.  
In Massachusetts, a city formerly in receivership, economic and demographic change is 
gradually occurring.  Newer market rate housing is available, shopping opportunities are 
plentiful, and health and medical access is convenient.  Moreover, developers and business 
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owners eager to make this investment in the city.  The leadership of this city is mindful of 
changing the dynamics.  They are managing this integration, constantly conscious of the need for 
balance, as the city is still heavily populated by low income immigrants and minorities.  “We 
spend a lot of time thinking about gentrification and how we manage it. Not sure any community 
has managed it well.  We have a chance because we are a smaller community.”  
2. Management must have its house of cards in order 
While strong leaders can navigate through organizational dysfunction, they cannot 
correct or lead effectively in a broken system. While human capital is the key to reform, human 
capital can also be its downfall.  In a school system interviewed for this research, the school 
system’s fiscal distress are well documented, as loose hiring practices in the past have come to 
haunt them financially.  During the economic peeks, the school district kept “hiring more and 
more people, which means higher salaries and benefits.”  Human capital now makes up to “75 to 
80%” of their budget.  Layoffs are imminent. The interviewee noted, while “stricter hiring 
policies” in the past would have eased the current fiscal turmoil.  Compounding to this school 
district’s troubles is the perception of abuse among its workforce. “The worst is long- term 
leaves.”  Unfortunately, the “lack of capacity… lack of experience… not very process driven” are 
among the reasons that potential abuses are not being investigated and among the many reasons 
that lead to the school district’s questionable predicament.  What would help is “accountability… 
checking in on relationships, [accurate] reporting of information.” Right sizing an organization 
with an ideal workforce is difficult, especially when you have the intricacies of bargaining units 
and potential discrimination lawsuits.  As a human resource person noted, “[human resource in a 
government] is a glass filled with dirty water [dirty water represents the less than stellar 
employees], you must have a pitcher with clean water [the clean water represents the ideal 
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employees] and you must pour into the glass until all the dirty water is gone.”  All this takes a 
substantial amount of time and investment.  As stated, human capital is the key to reform.  
Human capital can also be its downfall. 
3. State must offer supportive legislative programming and technical support 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 351 towns and cities (County of Dukes 
County, 2014).  The smallest town in Massachusetts is Gosnold with a only 120 registered voters 
(County of Dukes County, 2014).  As one municipal performance management specialist noted, 
“There are significant challenges to scaling down.” Moreover, “there is an inward correlation 
between population and the number of elected officials,” meaning that, “the smaller you get the 
more elected officials” your municipalities.  “Therefore, less centralized authority that can make 
things happen.”  This is not an ideal pathway to municipalities who desire reform and change.   
If the decline in state aid is a fixed reality, then localities must take the initiative to 
generate revenue— the state is obligated to assist and present to municipalities with best practice 
roadmap to help them navigate through this decline.  Specifically, states must offer technical 
assistance to guide them through the navigation of budgeting, financing, contracting, charter 
reform, and regionalization.  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts must take the initiative 
without impeding on local autonomy consultancy to assist them to help municipalities beef up 
their cash reserves to prevent and cushion future turmoil.  
4. A change in town management could be effective 
A city leader noted that a change in town government was a game changer for a 
municipality previously in receivership.  Formerly a mayoral form of government, the 
interviewee hinted that this created a toxic Machiavellian environment.  “When the mayor looks 
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down at the end of the hallway, he sees 9 aldermen,” i.e., the mayor effectively sees competition 
instead of those invested in the transformative success of the mayor,  perhaps, due to the 
aldermen’s own ambitions of securing the mayoral position in the future.  Now, with the change 
in government, the interviewee noted the city manager now sees the city council as partners.  
More, it helps that the city councilors must take one-year reprieve should they desire and seek 
out the city manager position.  This the new form of government: it frees the councilors from 
“plotting and planning, constantly defining our actions, against political pressures.  We can 
spend our time, thinking of the good things we can change such as economic development 
activities.”  Moreover, the new charter “requires us to do a 5 year financial planning” which 
allows the city to focus on the years ahead. 
5. Institute performance management measures 
Many local towns are not subscribing to the trend of the moment: big data.  In fact, many 
small towns in America practice the no data trend.  In fact, even in the 21
st
 century, many 
municipalities continue to store the data via “carbon paper, microfilm” locked in their archaic 
filing cabinet system.  “There is no impetus to use a culture of data, management and decisions 
based on data.”  Naturally, this lack of “feedback loop” goes nowhere and falls flat.  Perhaps, it 
is municipalities own lack of ambition or resources, but “a lot of cities and towns are stuck 
because of this.”  In small cities and towns that do not subscribe to the work order system, they 
cannot have a  “system of accountability because you don’t know what they are doing and you 
can’t track what they are doing.”  This also applies to area such as overtime and other 
expenditures.  It seems very basic, but this is the inclusive to the spectrum of data usage in small 
towns.  Through his consulting role, our interviewee has heard the gambit when it comes to 
excuses, “there are cut backs or we don’t have time.”  For fully operating and functioning 
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municipalities the best-case scenario is this, “we have a good data set, we aggregate it and 
present to public and use we use data to fix stuff.” 
6. Civic engagement is crucial to the future of the municipality 
In 1991, one of the cities in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered receivership.  
At the time, the city was heavily populated by low-income minorities from working class 
backgrounds.  Perhaps cultural, many residents did not trust local politicians and did not engage 
in civic participation. Corrupt municipal officials took advantage of the lack of civic 
participation by profiting from their unconsciousness, pillaging the city and its resources.  Post 
receivership, the demographics continue to be the same, and “civic participation is a constant 
challenge.”   
A city leader spoke a great deal about the concept of social capital and civic engagement, 
“the strategy to get people to know each other.  Connect so people can look after your kids; 
notify others if there is a job available, or if they saw your kid do something good or bad.  The 
goal is to build social capital.”  This will ensure future civic engagement and benefits for the 
municipality.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the statement of research, the goals of this exploratory research are:  (a) to confirm if 
strong state government leads to stronger local finances; and (b) to delve into the relationship 
dynamics between a strong state government and its municipalities.   This research paper 
concludes that (a) a strong state government does not lead to stronger local finance; and (b) the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, considered a strong state government, adheres to the 
Yong-Hua He 
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities  
University of Massachusetts Boston 
37 | P a g e  
 
philosophy “local decision, local control.” As such, as long as its municipality adheres to the 
law, the Commonwealth will rarely intervene in its municipal operations.   
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, like many other states suffering through an 
economic decline, has fewer resources and aid to distribute for local operations.  Notably in this 
research, many stakeholders in Massachusetts have a strong desire for “technical assistance.”  
While municipalities are not looking for intervention, they desire state’s guidance to navigate 
them through the budgeting, financing, contracting, charter reform, and regionalization process.  
The increase in technical assistance observes with the belief that local government will continue 
to local control of their business affairs.  In sum, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts must 
respect, recognize and embrace this municipal desire to ensure the financial health and wellness 
of their state.  
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY, DATA AND GRAPHS 
 
 Table 1. State Government Characteristics   
State 
Strong Government 
Assignment 
Receiver/ 
Financial 
Manager/ 
Overseer/ 
Coordinator  
State 
Agency  
Financial 
Control 
Board/ 
State- 
Appointed 
Board or 
Commission 
Restructure 
Finances: 
Renegotiate, 
Approve, or 
Issue Debt   
Restructure 
Finances: 
Labor   
Restructure 
Finances: 
Taxes, Fees, 
Credits    
Emergency 
Financing  
(Enhanced 
Credit 
Backing, 
Loans, 
Grants)  
Supervise 
Finances/ 
Technical 
Assistance 
(Including 
Budget 
approvals)  
Disincorporation/ 
Dissolve/ 
Consolidate 
Local 
Government   
Pew 
Comments: 
Law 
Designating 
Local Fiscal 
Distress 
Pew 
Comments: 
Bankruptcy 
Authorization 
Pew 
Comments: 
Intervention 
Program 
Alabama No State Interference                   No 
Yes (bonds 
only) no 
Alaska No State Interference                   no no no 
Arizona Special State Interference                   yes iii yes no* 
Arkansas No State Interference                   no yes no* 
California Special State Interference                   yes iv 
conditional 
(use of a 
neutral 
evaluator or 
declaration of 
fiscal 
emergency) no* 
Colorado No State Interference                   no limited no 
Connecticut Strong Government yes   yes yes yes yes   yes   no conditional yes 
Delaware No State Interference                   no no no 
Florida Strong Government   yes yes       yes yes   yes conditional yes 
Georgia No State Interference                   no 
no 
(specifically 
prohibited) no 
Hawaii No State Interference                   no no no 
Idaho No State Interference                   no yes no v 
Illinois Strong Government yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes   n/a vi limited yes 
Indiana Strong Government yes yes     yes   yes yes   yes vii no yes 
Iowa Special State Interference                   yes viii 
no (with 
exception) no* 
Kansas No State Interference                   no no no 
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Kentucky No State Interference                   no ix conditional no 
Louisiana No State Interference                   no conditional no 
Maine Strong Government   yes yes yes   yes yes yes   yes no yes 
Maryland No State Interference                   no no no 
Massachusetts Strong Government yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes   no no yes 
Michigan Strong Government yes yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes conditional yes 
Minnesota Special State Interference                   yes x yes no 
Mississippi No State Interference                   no no no 
Missouri No State Interference                   no yes no* 
Montana No State Interference                   no 
yes (but not 
counties) no 
Nebraska No State Interference                   no yes no 
Nevada Strong Government yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
New 
Hampshire Limited State Interference yes           yes     no no yes 
New Jersey Strong Government yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes   yes conditional yes 
New Mexico Limited State Interference   yes         yes yes   yes no yes 
New York Strong Government     yes yes yes   yes yes   yes conditional yes 
North 
Carolina Strong Government   yes yes yes   yes   yes   yes conditional yes 
North Dakota No State Interference                   no no no 
Ohio Limited State Interference yes   yes yes       yes   yes conditional yes 
Oklahoma No State Interference                   no yes no 
Oregon Limited State Interference     yes yes       yes   yes limited yes 
Pennsylvania Strong Government yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes   yes conditional yes 
Rhode Island Strong Government yes   yes yes   yes   yes   yes conditional yes 
South 
Carolina No State Interference                   no yes no 
South Dakota No State Interference                   no no no 
Tennessee Strong Government yes yes   yes   yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Texas Limited State Interference yes             yes   no yes yes 
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Utah No State Interference                   no no no 
Vermont No State Interference                   no no no 
Virginia No State Interference                   no no no 
Washington No State Interference                   no yes no* 
West Virginia No State Interference                   no no no 
Wisconsin No State Interference                   no no no 
Wyoming No State Interference                   no no no 
 
(Pew Charitable Trust, 2013) 
Strong Government Assignment:  
 Strong government—Over seven affirmatives confirming support of local government in times of fiscal distress 
 Limited state interference—Between three to seven affirmatives addressing  support of local government during times 
of fiscal distress 
 Special state interference—Between one to three affirmatives addressing support of local government, generally school 
districts or townships, in times of fiscal distress  
 No state interference—Little to no interference addressing support of local government during times of fiscal distress 
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Table 2. Financial Indicators Used to Measure Fiscal Condition 
Indicator 
Type Financial Indicator Formula Significance 
Demographics High need population 
Percent under 18 plus over 65 years of 
age 
A higher percentage of under 18 and over 65 years of age suggest a higher need population.   
Potentially attached to higher long term costs 
Demographics Poverty  
Percent of poverty households or 
public assistance recipients Higher ratios denotes higher need population as a whole 
Expenditure Core operating expense ratio 
Operating expenditures/total 
expenditures Higher ratio denotes there is more spending on core services for the municipality 
Expenditure 
Employee per thousand over 
population 
Number of government 
employees/population Higher percentage suggest more reliance on government support or low  entrepreneurial industries  
Expenditure Operating deficits Total revenues/Total expenditures Operating ratios greater than 1.00 indicates a budget surplus – less than 1.00 a deficit  
Revenue Intergovernmental reliance 
Intergovernmental operating 
revenue/General fund revenues Higher the ratio means more reliance on state and federal resources 
Revenue Revenue per capita 
Total revenues (excludes capital 
projects)/population Higher revenue per capita suggest more solvency for services 
Revenue Property tax revenues 
Property tax revenues/General fund 
revenues Higher revenue per capita suggest more solvency for services 
Solvency Surplus (deficit per capita) Total surpluses (deficits) / population  Deficits indicate a lack of funds, a needed increase in revenues, and room for service improvements  
Solvency Current ratio Current assets / Current liabilities  
Ratio is an indication of a government’s ability to meet short-term financial obligations with current 
assets  
Solvency Long-term liability ratio  Long-term Liabilities / Total assets  Higher ratio indicates lower level of ability to pay off long-term debt or a strain on future resources  
 
(Rivenbark, 2009), (Brown, 1993), (Maher, 2009), (Maher, 2013), (Wang, 2009) 
  
Table 3:  Designation of State Government and Weighted Ratio 
Using the research methods explained in the research metholodies section, there is no data 
suggesting strong government leads to stronger muncipal finance.  The ranking is as follows:   
 
Ranking State 
 Weighted 
Ratio  State Government 
1 WY          3.58  No State Interference 
2 MT          2.15  No State Interference 
3 MA          1.76  Strong Government 
4 ID          1.66  No State Interference 
5 AK          1.65  No State Interference 
6 NH          1.62  Limited State Interference 
7 CT          1.47  Special State Interference 
8 SD          1.46  No State Interference 
9 MD          1.23  No State Interference 
10 RI          1.02  Strong Government 
11 OK          0.98  No State Interference 
12 ND          0.89  No State Interference 
13 NE          0.82  No State Interference 
14 LA          0.72  No State Interference 
15 WI          0.66  No State Interference 
16 ME          0.49  Strong Government 
17 DE          0.45  No State Interference 
18 VA          0.41  No State Interference 
19 IL          0.40  Strong Government 
20 MO          0.35  No State Interference 
21 KS          0.33  No State Interference 
22 MS          0.30  No State Interference 
23 IA          0.25  Special State Interference 
24 MI          0.23  Strong Government 
25 OH          0.20  Limited State Interference 
26 WV          0.16  No State Interference 
27 MN          0.11  Special State Interference 
28 CO          0.09  No State Interference 
29 TN          0.06  Strong Government 
30 AZ          0.05  Special State Interference 
31 GA        (0.02) No State Interference 
32 VT        (0.13) No State Interference 
33 PA        (0.17) Strong Government 
34 AR        (0.18) No State Interference 
35 HI        (0.26) No State Interference 
36 NM        (0.30) Limited State Interference 
37 OR        (0.31) Limited State Interference 
38 SC        (0.38) No State Interference 
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39 FL        (0.39) Strong State Government 
40 UT        (0.44) No State Interference 
41 IN        (0.57) Strong Government 
42 NC        (0.67) Strong Government 
43 KY        (0.70) No State Interference 
44 AL        (0.77) No State Interference 
45 CA        (0.89) Special State Interference 
46 NJ        (0.97) Strong Government 
47 WA        (0.99) No State Interference 
48 NV        (1.10) Strong Government 
49 NY        (1.41) Strong Government 
50 TX        (2.35) Limited State Interference 
 
Table 4: Data and Graphs:  
 Count of analysis 
Statistics 
Strong Gov   
N Valid 50 
Missing 0 
 
Strong Government 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strong State Government 14 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Limited State Control 5 10.0 10.0 38.0 
Special State Control 4 8.0 8.0 46.0 
Weak State Government 27 54.0 54.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
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 Descriptive statistics on indicators 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Population 2011 50 37101352 567329 37668681 6219258.80 980122.248 6930510.877 
Number of Government 
Employees/Population 
50 .0027829 .0001023 .0028852 .000662530 .0000794449 .0005617604 
Personal Income Per Capita 50 17137 20670 37807 27551.78 559.425 3955.733 
Percent under 18+ over 65 50 .15 .25 .40 .2970 .00373 .02638 
Percent of Poverty Households or 
Public Assistance Recipients 
50 .14 .08 .22 .1427 .00434 .03070 
Operating Expenditures/Total 
Expenditures 
50 .19 .69 .88 .8080 .00638 .04512 
Number of Government 
Employees/Population 
50 .00278291569 .00010229328 .00288520897 .0006625299023 .00007944491698 .00056176039531 
Total Revenues/Total Expenditures 50 .13 .92 1.06 1.0019 .00435 .03074 
Intergovernmental operating 
revenue/General Fund Revenues 
50 .51 .17 .68 .3878 .01174 .08303 
Total Revenues (Excludes Capital 
Projects)/Population 
50 6.56 1.97 8.52 4.4447 .16964 1.19952 
Property Tax Revenues/General Fund 
Revenues 
50 .46 .09 .55 .2688 .01509 .10671 
Total Surpluses (Deficits) / Population 50 .77 -.41 .36 .0058 .02088 .14763 
Current Assets / Current Liabilities 50 2.49 .43 2.92 .8924 .05469 .38672 
Long-term Liabilities / Total Assets 50 1.77 .34 2.11 1.2363 .05293 .37424 
Valid N (listwise) 50       
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 Positive financial indicators 
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Positive Financial Indicators 
Total Surpluses (Deficits) / Population  Property Tax Revenues/General Fund Revenues Operating Expenditures/Total Expenditures Current Assets / Current Liabilities  Total Revenues/Total Expenditures 
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 Negative financial indicators 
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Negative Financial Indicators 
Long-term Liabilities / Total Assets  Percent under 18+ over 65 Percent of Poverty Households or Public Assistance Recipients Number of Government Employees/Population Intergovernmental operating revenue/General Fund Revenues 
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 Authorities state descriptive statistics 
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SAMPLE STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONS 
 
Budget  
1. What do you see as the role of city government? 
2. What is your impression of the city’s financial condition?  
3. Describe a time when you had to prioritize services in order to meet budget 
parameters.  How did you manage competing interests? 
4. Describe a time when unforeseen budget expenditure affected your budget forecast?  How 
did you reallocate resources?  
5. Personnel expenses are the largest expense.  How does your agency manage this rising 
expenditures?   
 
Financing  
1. Do you experience with debt financing? Please give an example. What are the biggest 
challenges to debt financing in your municipality?  
2. In your budget planning process, do you earmark for a deteriorating infrastructure? 
3. If applicable, describe the most successful capital improvement project you were 
responsible for? What made it successful?  
4. What is your opinion of “pay as you go” financing of maintenance and capital projects? 
Special assessments? Special taxing districts?  
Internal Administrative Relations 
1. Please speak of a time when you had to deal with ay constituent that disagrees with you 
with regards to financing/funding of projects? How did you resolve? 
2. Let’s discuss personnel issues:  
a. Have you been at the bargaining table and been actively engaged in negotiating an 
agreement?  
b. Have you experienced mediation, fact finding or arbitration? Which ones?  
c. Do you consider the financial ramifications? 
3. What is your perception of the local government’s ability to provide adequate funding for 
long term liabilities? 
4. What steps have you taken to improve sustainability? 
5. Share an example of a time when you used financial information and/or other program 
relevant information to support or drive an organizational decision.  What challenges did 
you face and how did you handle them? 
External Administrative Relations 
1. What is intergovernmental relationship at your agency?  How do you leverage state 
resources and grant funding for projects? 
2. What steps have you taken to create valuable partnerships to leverage relationships?  
3. What external considerations do you find crucial to your planning process? 
4. How do you deal with special interest or single interest groups?  
 
Management  
1. What in your opinion is the most serious issue today in local government management? 
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